The passenger ship Royal Majesty (32,396 tons, 173.16 meter length) ran aground on the Rose and Crown Shoal at about 2225 on June 10, 1995. The ship was on route from Bermuda to Boston, Massachusetts. The shoal is approximately 10 miles east of Nantucket. Although the accident caused deformation of the ship’s double bottom hull, there was no penetration or cracking and no fuel oil was spilled. Damage to the ship was estimated at $7 million.
UK P&I explains the errors and negligence which caused this incident.
The incident
One hour before the scheduled departure time of 1200 on June 9 from the port in Bermuda, the navigator performed tests of navigation equipment (compasses, repeaters, radar, NACOS 25, GPS, Loran-C) and confirmed that everything was operating normally. The navigator stated that when the Bermuda pilot left the ship (about 1230 on June 9), he compared the position data of the GPS and Loran-C and confirmed that the two positions within about one mile of each other.
At 1000 on June 10, the watch changed and the navigator and two quartermasters were on duty. The navigator maintained a course of 336˚ and a speed of 14.1 knots. At 1600 the watch changed and the C/O relieved the navigator.
The C/O used GPS data to check the ship’s position once every hour during his watch and used Loran-C as a backup system.
At about 1920, the ship passed a radar target that was believed to be the BA buoy, which was on the port side at a distance of 1.5 miles. However, visual confirmation of the target was not possible because of glare on the ocean surface caused by the setting sun. The master was notified that the ship had passed the BA buoy.
At 1000 on June 10, the watch changed and the navigator and two quartermasters were on duty. The navigator maintained a course of 336˚ and a speed of 14.1 knots. At 1600 the watch changed and the C/O relieved the navigator.
The C/O used GPS data to check the ship’s position once every hour during his watch and used Loran-C as a backup system.
At about 1920, the ship passed a radar target that was believed to be the BA buoy, which was on the port side at a distance of 1.5 miles. However, visual confirmation of the target was not possible because of glare on the ocean surface caused by the setting sun. The master was notified that the ship had passed the BA buoy.
At 2000, the second officer and two quartermasters relieved the C/O. About 2030, the lookout on the port bridge wing reported to the second officer the sighting of a yellow light off the ship’s port side. The second officer acknowledged the report but took no action.
Shortly after the yellow light was sighted, both starboard and port lookouts reported sightings of several red lights on the port side of the ship, but the second officer took no action.
At 2145, although the BB buoy had not been sighted, the second officer reported to the captain that he had seen it. The report was based on the second officer’s belief that the ship was on course and that perhaps the radar did not reflect the buoy.
Shortly after 2200, the port bridge wing lookout reported the sighting of blue and white water dead ahead. The second officer acknowledged the information but no action was taken. The port lookout subsequently reported that the ship had passed through the blue and white water. About 2220, the ship suddenly veered to port and then sharply to starboard and heeled to port. The master ran to the bridge and confirmed that the ship had run around. The master checked the GPS and Loran-C position data and for the first time realized that there was a difference of at least 15 miles.
Analysis
The Royal Majesty had an integrated bridge system (NACOS 25) and GPS was selected as the source of position data for this system. After the accident, an examination of the GPS antenna and receiver revealed that the antenna cable had separated from the antenna connector. As a result, the GPS receiver had been sending to the NACOS 25 autopilot position data determined by dead reckoning rather than by signals from satellites. Longitude data was calculated by using dead reckoning and there were no corrections to reflect the effects of the wind, tide or ocean currents. Over time, an east-northeasterly wind and sea had pushed the ship to the west-southwest, eventually resulting in an error of 17 miles.
Failures and errors involving monitoring
The crew’s failure to detect for more than 34 hours that the ship was not using GPS data raised serious concerns about the performance of the watch officers and the master. The C/O and second officer were on watch prior to the grounding and failed to realize that the Royal Majesty was not following the voyage plan despite several indications of trouble. This is gross negligence.
1) Master
The master visited the bridge frequently and asked the C/O and second officer to visually confirm the sighting of the BA buoy and BB buoy. Therefore, the master took reasonable actions to confirm that the ship was on course. However, he did not ask for a crosscheck of the GPS and Loran-C position data and did not perform a comparison of his own. Consequently, he was relying on the automated navigation system with the other officers.
2) C/O
The buoy detected by radar at about 1900 was the AR buoy that marks the location of a sunken ship about 17 miles to the west of the Royal Majesty’s intended route. Although the buoy could not be visually identified, a positioning crosscheck (GPS and Loran-C) would probably have made the C/O aware of the navigation error.
3) Second officer
The second officer gave a false report to the master about the sighting of buoys. Furthermore, he took no action despite receiving reports from the lookout of unusual sightings near the ship and on the ocean surface.
Lessons learned
The direct cause of this accident is the loss of GPS position data. Moreover, the navigator failed to crosscheck the ship’s location by using two methods that are used when GPS position data is lost. However, as was explained earlier, all members of the bridge team were guilty of significant negligence as well as numerous small errors. The bridge team was unable to sever the resulting error chain and the result was the grounding of the ship. This accident underscores the importance of the frequent use of suitable measures to monitor a voyage in order to have accurate information about the status of the voyage at all times.
Closing message
This report explains issues involving the four voyage plan preparation steps (appraisal, planning, execution, monitoring) by using examples of accidents involving these plans. The causes of these accidents demonstrate the close relationship among two or more of these steps. The conclusion is that the completion of a safe voyage requires the use of all available resources by the bridge team for every voyage. Furthermore, no part of the prescribed procedure should be omitted during the preparation of the voyage plan.
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Source: UK P&I Club
