Lessons Learned: Man Overboard Cargo Vessel

484

Bahamas Maritime Authority reports of a man overboard incident.

What happened

On the evening of 28 March 2024, the Bahamas flagged coastal general cargo vessel was outbound from Groveport, UK. After rigging the pilot ladder, one seafarer returned to the accommodation whilst the other stayed on deck to smoke a cigarette. Around fifteen minutes later the master called the seafarer on the handheld radio to say that the pilot was ready to disembark but got no reply. Having called several times, the master went to the messroom and instigated a search on deck.

At 22:50 the master informed the pilot that they had a potential man overboard at which point the pilot asked the master to raise the alarm, informed vessel traffic services and stopped engines. The pilot boat, which was about to collect a pilot from the vessel ahead, quickly started a search and they were joined by multiple air and sea assets.

The search continued through the night but the seafarer’s body was found, washed ashore, next morning.

Why it happened

A post-mortem indicated that the victim died as a result of acute myocardial ischaemia, ischaemic heart disease and severe coronary artery atheroma. There were no signs of drowning.

Notwithstanding the cause of death, the victim was on deck, in the dark and alone, in close proximity to an opening in the ship’s rails with no fall protection or personal floatation device. There were no lifejackets suitable for work onboard the vessel and no administrative barriers that related to the task.

Conclusions

A post-mortem indicated that the victim died as a result of acute myocardial ischaemia, ischaemic heart disease and severe coronary artery atheroma. This underlying health condition had not been identified as part of the seafarer’s medical examination.

Nevertheless, the victim was on deck, in the dark and alone, in close proximity to an opening in the ship’s rails with no fall protection or personal floatation device.

The crew were regularly exposed to unnecessary risk when rigging or retrieving the pilot ladder – the work was not considered to be “work over the side” so no controls were in place: there were no lifejackets suitable for work onboard the vessel and no administrative barriers that related to the task.

In line with requirements, the gate in the ship’s rails opened inwards but its design meant that it had to remain open when the pilot ladder was in place – increasing exposure to risk.

Whilst it would not have had an impact on the outcome of the casualty, providing the pilot (and subsequently Humber VTS) with the incorrect information that the man overboard was wearing a lifejacket had a detrimental impact on the modelling of the search operation. Similarly, the use of the time and location of the initial report meant that the correct datum was not established for the search.

Whilst it would not have had an impact on the outcome of the casualty, Humber lifeboat was waiting in the lock at Grimsby for over an hour after mobilising. Humber lifeboat’s availability may be more restricted than identified on the basis of tidal predictions alone.

Action taken and Recommendations

The Ship Management has

  • Provided vessels in its fleet with inflatable lifejackets.
  • Reviewed the design of openings in ship’s rails throughout its fleet. The gate on Fri Sea has been altered to allow it to be closed when the pilot ladder is rigged.
  • Added anti-slip coating to the decks between pilot ladder and accommodation.
  • Revised its procedure for rigging of the pilot ladder (including mandatory use of inflatable lifejackets) and issued a fleet circular explaining the changes.

Considering the actions taken, there are no further recommendations.

Did you Subscribe to our daily newsletter?

It’s Free Click here to Subscribe!

Source: BMA