The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) has issued an investigation report into the grounding of a bulk carrier in Port Hedland, Western Australia, on 9 April 2022.
What happened
On the morning of 9 April 2022, the fully laden capesize bulk carrier departed its berth in Port Hedland, Western Australia, with a harbour pilot on board and 4 tugs assisting. The first tug was cast off shortly after departure, and the ship continued its passage through the port’s navigational channel. As the pilot navigated the ship through a turn in the channel, the 2 shoulder tugs were cast off and retained as passive escorts, while the aft tug remained tethered as an active escort.
Shortly after the turn was completed, the ship experienced a loss of electrical power supply to all the ship’s analogue rudder angle indicators and, a few minutes later, struck the western batter of the channel. The pilot manoeuvred the ship back into the centre of the channel and, with the assistance of additional tugs and a second pilot, resumed the outbound passage and conducted the ship to an anchorage outside port limits.
Subsequently, the ship was found to be taking on water in the number 1 and 2 port double-bottom water ballast tanks. Surveys and inspections conducted over the following days identified substantial damage to the ship’s bottom shell plating, including hull breaches of the shipside shell plating of the damaged tanks and the failure of the transverse bulkhead between the tanks. There were no reported injuries or pollution of the sea as a result of the grounding.
Contributing factors
- During an outbound pilotage, the tracking motor of the vessel‘s bridge-mounted omnidirectional rudder angle indicator failed, resulting in a short circuit that tripped the common circuit breaker for all the ship’s analogue rudder angle indicators, with an associated loss of power to these rudder indicators. Consequently, the bridge team assumed that the ship’s steering had failed and implemented steering failure emergency procedures.
- Following the initiation of emergency procedures for a steering failure, the pilot’s manoeuvring orders, aimed at maintaining directional control of the ship, resulted in an uncontrolled turn to port. Despite attempts to arrest this turn, the vessel‘s port bow collided with the western side of the channel at a speed of about 6.1 knots.
- The pilot’s decision to cast off the port and starboard escort tugs before the ship passed beacons 30 and 31 was inconsistent with the port’s identified and implemented best practice escort towage strategy. Consequently, when the rudder angle indicator failed, the pilot was unable to make the fullest possible use of these tugs to either reduce the ship’s speed or arrest the turn to port.
- The Pilbara Ports Authority’s port user guidelines and procedures did not reflect the best practice escort towage guidance detailed in the port’s draft escort towage strategy and business continuity plan. The detail of these improved towage practices, designed to reduce the risk of channel blockages, were also not integrated into the Port Hedland Pilots’ safety management system and were, consequently, inconsistently applied by pilots.
- Although the vessel’s steering and rudder angle indicator systems complied with the applicable rules and regulations, neither the SOLAS regulations nor the rules of the ship’s responsible classification society, Lloyd’s Register, mandated protection of the ship’s rudder angle indication systems against a single point of failure in electrical power supply. Nor did they require installation of audible or visual alerts to notify the bridge team of a power failure affecting the indicators.
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Source: ATSB
