This summary is based on the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) investigation into a fire and subsequent power loss on board a roll-on/roll-off cargo vessel at King George Dock, Hull, in September 2021.
What Happened
During departure, a fire broke out in the auxiliary engine room. The vessel lost propulsion and electrical power. Tug assistance enabled the vessel to be safely re-berthed, and the fire was eventually extinguished. The auxiliary engine room sustained significant damage, though there were no injuries.
Why It Happened
The fire originated when mechanical failures in one of the auxiliary engines caused exhaust gases to leak onto a flexible fuel hose. The hose subsequently failed, releasing pressurised fuel that ignited upon contact with hot exhaust surfaces. The hose itself had been installed during a modification, was not of the correct specification, and had been positioned inappropriately without classification approval or oversight.
Compounding the event, the emergency diesel generator did not supply power due to a fault in its circuit breaker, which left the vessel without emergency systems at a critical time. The fixed carbon dioxide fire-extinguishing system was also ineffective because of a defective flexible hose assembly and leaks in the pilot system.
Crew actions during the release of CO₂ did not align with standard procedures, reducing its effectiveness. Overall, the combination of technical failures, inappropriate system modifications, and procedural weaknesses contributed to the severity of the incident.
Actions Taken
Following the investigation, the MAIB issued safety bulletins warning the wider industry about risks posed by defective and improperly installed flexible hoses in both fuel and fire-extinguishing systems. Service providers and suppliers reviewed and amended procurement, quality control, and testing processes for hose assemblies to strengthen oversight and reliability. Recommendations were also directed to flag authorities and classification societies to improve requirements for testing fixed fire-extinguishing systems, enhancing service supplier approval standards, and strengthening emergency power supply verification. In addition, procedural improvements for onboard response, crew training, and emergency drills were highlighted as necessary corrective measures.
Lessons Learned
- System modifications must be formally approved and assessed for safety risks before implementation.
- Flexible fuel hoses should be avoided where possible; if used, they must be of approved quality, correctly routed, and adequately protected.
- Fire-extinguishing and emergency power systems require regular functional testing, not only visual inspections.
- Crew drills should be realistic, frequent, and aligned with emergency procedures to ensure correct actions under pressure.
- Stronger oversight from classification societies, service suppliers, and operators is essential to uphold international safety standards.
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Source: MAIBInvReport
