Summary
On 29 March 2015, Halcyon 1, drawing 5.0 m forward and 5.2 m aft, left Manzanillo Terminal, Panama. She had on board 2157 tonnes of containerised cargo. The vessel had left the port without her starboard anchor, which had been reported lost on 20 March 2015.
On the morning of 01 April 2015, while adrift in position 09° 41.0´ N 080° 15.9’ W the crew initiated operational tests on the vessel’s starboard windlass. There was light to gentle breeze. Visibility was good with a swell of 1.5 m. Air temperature was 30ºC.
The chief mate was in charge of the operation. He was assisted by the bosun, two able seamen, a fitter and an engine rating. All crew members were reportedly wearing personal protective equipment.
Documents submitted to the MSIU indicated that a job hazardous analysis was carried out prior to the recovery of the anchor chain. The operation involved picking up the anchor chain. During the heaving process, the hydraulic motor of the windlass broke down. With part of the anchor chain outside of the hawse pipe, an emergency recovery of the chain was organised by the crew.
A hot work permit (Form P 002) and an unscheduled work permit (Form P 012), were duly completed by the master as required in the vessel’s safety management system.
Cause of the accident
The immediate cause of the accident was considered to be the anchor chain’s straining and twisting. At that moment, the fitter was handling the shackle when two of his left hand fingers were caught and crushed between the shackle and the chain link.
The effects of the swell on the ship and the possible consequential movements of the chain appear to have caused the accident. It has to be acknowledged, however, that it would have been very difficult for the crew members to qualify and quantify the true risk, given that circumstances may lead people to perceive risk very differently. Moreover, the less knows about the dynamics of the task being undertaken (on the actual process), the higher the possibility that hazards are not foreseen, hence compromising the understanding of the risks involved.
It is only with gathered data that those involved may begin to understand the risk involved – and perception increases to approach the true risk. Data, however, was an issue in this case because it was not too often that the vessel lost an anchor and required this operation. In actual fact, this was the first ever occurrence in which the ship lost one of her anchors.
The inaccurate perception of risk therefore had an effect on the operational behaviour of the crew members involved, including the injured crew member. Then, one cannot omit the personality trait of the crew members involved, i.e. the risk tolerance, given that the crew members had to operate in close proximity of workplace risks.
It is very normal that risk tolerance and exposure may be a result of the level of risk aversion of the person involved and the value which is attributed to the goal of a particular situation. In this case, the task to retrieve the anchor chain was crucial – to an extent that alternative means were devised to retrieve the anchor chain when the windlass failed.
Risk tolerance was therefore a matter of both social cognitive and personality approaches towards the task in hand and impacted significantly on the crew members’ decisionmaking.
Actions Taken
Following the accident, the Company organised additional training courses and awareness for crew members on safe working practices.
Recommendations
As a result of the safety actions taken by the Company, no recommendations have been made.
Disclaimer: The above image is for representation of the below incident and need not be considered as an actual case image.
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Source: Transport Malta
