Bulk Carrier Loses Control Causing Crew Injury

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Transport Malta’s Marine Safety Investigation Unit has issued an investigation report into the loss of control of the Maltese registered bulk carrier Julietta D, on the morning of 31 January 2022.

The incident

On the morning of 31 January 2022, Julietta D was holding its anchorage position in Ijmuiden Anchorage Area no. 7, using the port anchor and the main engine. At one point, Julietta D’s heading altered substantially, and the vessel started falling South, onto the nearby anchored Pechora Star. Within a few minutes, Julietta D’s port hull made contact with the bow of Pechora Star and continued making contact with Pechora Star’s port side until both vessels were eventually clear of each other. Julietta D sustained two hull breaches in way of its engine-room and water ingress was confirmed. Julietta D continued drifting in a somewhat Southerly direction, into a windfarm area, still under construction. Shortly after making contact with the windfarm’s transition section, the crew members of Julietta D were airlifted from the vessel, following which, preparations for a salvage operation ensued. Unmanned and not under command, the vessel made contact with another platform within the same windfarm area.

Eventually, tug Sovereign was assigned to salvage Julietta D, reaching its position at 1550 (LT). After securing the towing line, and while the crew members were on their way to the bridge, a wave washed over the main deck, inflicting serious injuries to two crew members. Julietta D was towed towards the port of Rotterdam, the Netherlands, and arrived within port limits on 01 February, at approximately 1400 (LT).

Analysis

Purpose

The purpose of a marine safety investigation is to determine the circumstances and safety factors of the accident as a basis for making recommendations, to prevent further marine casualties or incidents from occurring in the future.

Probable cause of Julietta D’s drift

The port anchor, along with 10 shackles of chain, were found lying on the seabed, in the vicinity of Julietta D’s re-located anchorage position. This suggested that rather than dragging her anchor towards Pechora Star, Julietta D had in fact lost her port anchor and drifted towards Pechora Star.

Conclusions

Immediate Safety Factors

  • Julietta D’s port anchor cable broke, causing the vessel to fall away from the wind and drift in a Southerly direction.
  • Julietta D’s light ballast condition contributed to a larger windage area and for her propeller to be only partially immersed. This reduced her manoeuvrability capabilities, and which contributed to the vessel being overwhelmed by the prevailing weather conditions.

Other Safety Factors

  • Ijmuiden Anchorage Area no. 7 afforded no shelter from the prevailing weather conditions.
  • The master of Julietta D was under the impression that the vessel was dragging its anchor rather than drifting, dedicating time to try and make sense of the incomplete contextual information.
  • There was not enough time for Pechora Star to weigh her anchor and move clear from the drifting Julietta D.
  • Accident data indicated that Julietta D’s main engine was operating seamlessly on the day of the occurrence, thus it was not considered to have contributed to this occurrence.
  • It was considered likely that Julietta D’s main engine stopped upon allision with Pechora Star as her propeller struck the latter vessel’s anchor cable.
  • The crew members of Julietta D were unable to repair the damages to the vessel’s hull in way of the engine-room. Consequently, the master was informed the water ingress flowing into the engine-room would most likely cause electrical damage and hence, he took the decision to stop the main engine to prevent any further damages.
  • The master’s decision to abandon Julietta D was influenced by the time required for a tugboat to reach the vessel’s position, and his concerns on the hazards posed by the windfarm and rigs, which lay in the direction of Julietta D’s drift.
  • No barriers existed (physical and / or procedural), which could have helped prevent Julietta D’s breach inside the windfarm perimeter and the subsequent allisions with the transition section of a wind turbine and the jacket of a transformer platform.
  • Sovereign took almost five hours to reach Julietta D’s location. Sovereign was about 25 nautical miles away and its crew members were engaged in maintenance work on the tug’s crane when it was appointed, and the inclement weather in the area, which would have reduced the tug’s speed.
  • The intraship communication on board Sovereign was not effective once the tug was in the open sea in inclement weather conditions. This contributed to both the chief officer and second officer ‘A’ being unaware of a rolling wave on deck, which slammed them against a portable ladder leading to their injuries.

Other Findings

  • Julietta D had sufficient reserve buoyancy and the salvors were able to take control of the vessel and secure the vessel in a safe port.
  • Julietta D was considered by her crew members to have already been prepared for heavy weather conditions on 31 January 2022.
  • The vessel’s SMM section on anchoring referred to the environmental conditions described in IACS UR A1 (Section A1.1.4; as of Rev 6 of the UR), as two separate conditions that if forecasted or present, should be avoided. However, since Julietta D was built in 2013, her Equipment Number would have been calculated based on the UR A1 Rev 5, which was valid at the time. In Rev 5 of this UR, there is no mention of an alternative weather condition, which should be considered.
  • Environment condition ‘1’, referred to in the vessel’s SMM, indicated a weather condition of 25 ms-1 (48 knots) wind speed and no waves. The safety investigation was of the view that this weather condition is unattainable / ambiguous.
  • Vessels’ anchoring equipment is designed for the temporary mooring of a vessel within a harbour or sheltered area. However; not all anchorage areas offer shelter, and / or a good holding ground

Actions taken

Safety Actions Taken During the Course of the Safety Investigation

CST Schiffahrts, Germany

Following the accident involving Pechora Star, CST Schiffarhrts promulgated the Company’s investigation report within its fleet to share the lessons learnt.

Boskalis Offshore Transport, The Netherlands Following the injuries of two of its crew members, Boskalis Offshore Transport took the following safety actions:

  • a new type of safety helmet with an adjustable chin strap was introduced to increase head protection;
  • a new set of portable radios and compatible shoulder straps were provided on board Sovereign;
  • a procedure to secure the Dyneema towing line on deck was adapted on board, to prevent it from getting entangled in green seas. This procedure also eliminated the need for crew members to be on deck to keep the lie in position, thus reducing the exposure of the crew members to incoming waves.

Recommendations

Norbulk Shipping UK Ltd. is recommended to:

  • 02/2023_R1 clarify the vessel’s SMM anchor planning in the description of environmental condition ‘1’, including the provision of technical guidance to
    the master on necessary actions when another vessel anchors very close not own vessel.
  • 02/2023_R2 install CCTV cameras to capture a clear view of the forecastle deck, so that in cases of inclement weather conditions, the OOWs would have the
    necessary information of the circumstances at the location, without having to risk sending crew members on site. This may also assist in the monitoring of
    the anchor cable remotely whilst the vessel is at anchor.
  • 02/2023_R3 provide technical assistance to the master on the taking of water ballast during inclement weather, following the tendering of the Notice of Readiness (NoR).
  • 02/2023_R4 promulgate this safety investigation report with its fleet to ensure lessons learnt are shared.
  • 02/2023_R5 provide further information on actions to be taken in cases of critical structural damages sustained by the vessel, to crew members employed by the
    company.

Vattenfall and TenneT are recommended to:

02/2023_R6 explore and study the possibilities to install (innovative) physical barrier systems to prevent allisions with critical windfarm structures

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Source: Transport Malta