Summary
MV Agria, a Maltese registered conventional Supramax, geared bulk carrier, arrived at Rio Grande, Brazil on 12 March 2015 to load her cargo. The vessel dropped her anchor at the outer roads, waiting for her turn to berth. The vessel was expected to load about 52,519 MT of Brazilian milling wheat in bulk in all of her cargo holds.
On 16 March 2015 early morning, the pilot boarded the vessel and by 03:48 (LT), Agria was safely moored starboard side alongside at Tegrasa Terminal.
A hose test was carried out on all five cargo holds and following a general inspection, cargo loading was eventually approved at about 07:35 on the same day. Loading operations commenced an hour later, using shore equipment.
The operations were completed on 19 March 2015 at about 06:00. Upon completion of the loading operations, a local fumigation company boarded the vessel in order to fumigate the cargo as per charter party requirements.
The entire fumigation process was carried out by the shore company and the ship’s crew members were not involved. In fact, the vessel was only responsible to provide electrical supply at the right voltage and power to the fans used during the fumigation process. The fumigation operation commenced at 0620 and was completed at 0820.
The fumigant used was aluminium phosphide tablets. The applied dosage was in accordance with Fumigation Certificate No. 023/2015, dated 19 March 2015. The Certificate was issued by the company responsible for the fumigation process. Crew members were instructed that no ventilation was allowed in the cargo holds for 288 hours (12 days). Following the fumigation process, the cargo holds were sealed and Agria prepared for the sea voyage.
The pilot boarded Agria at about 0830 and the vessel cast off the berth to commence its voyage to her discharge ports, namely Chittagong and Mongla in Bangladesh. The pilot disembarked at 1100 and full away on passage was rung at 1200.
Nine hours after the fumigation process had been completed, i.e. at about 1730, Agria experienced a minor explosion in cargo hold no. 5. Soon after the accident, the master notified the Company and activated the vessel’s contingency plan. All crew members were mustered inside the accommodation block and the air-condition system was set to recirculation mode to prevent any smoke from entering the living spaces. Cargo hold temperatures were recorded and monitored.
Inspections of the cargo holds were carried out by the crew members and on 22 March 2015, the vessel arrived at Rio Grande outer anchorage and dropped anchors in position 32° 19.5’S 051° 54.1’W. Following the necessary surveys, investigations and minor repairs, the vessel departed the area and resumed her voyage to Chittagong.
The ship did not sustain any structural damages as a result of the accident. Damages were limited to a number of hatch cover cleats, which were repaired before the vessel resumed her voyage. Moreover, it was estimated that about nine tonnes of cargo were damaged and had to be discharged from the vessel.
Similar Accidents
In the early morning of 22 December 2012, the Maltese registered bulk carrier Theofylaktos sustained an initial explosion in cargo hold no. 4, followed by further explosions inside other cargo holds. The vessel had loaded grain cargo in bulk from Rio Grande and was carrying out in-transit fumigation with AlP tablets and a ‘J System’. No injuries had been reported by the vessel although it had sustained some structural damages.
Cause of the Explosion
The mechanical damage sustained by the cargo hatch cover cleats is consistent with the occurrence of a gas phase explosion inside the cargo hold.
Although the crew members did not make reference to white smoke coming from the cargo hold, in view of the presence of PH3, it was concluded that the explosion was the result of ignition of this gas. A post– accident inspection of the area after the cargo hold was declared safe, revealed that the fan used in the ‘J-System’ was appropriately earthed. Moreover, the post-accident inspection did not identify potential sources of ignition inside the cargo hold since both the explosion-proof light and the switch were undamaged. It was therefore established that these two items were not the source of the ignition.
Actions Taken
Following the accident, the Company carried out an internal investigation in accordance with Section 9 of the ISM Code. The results of the investigation were communicated to all Company vessels.
The Company has also reviewed its policy on the hiring of fumigation companies and has requested its crew members to ensure that safety checks related to the fumigation process are effectively carried out.
Conclusion
- The mechanical damage sustained by the cargo hatch cover cleats is consistent with the occurrence of a gas phase explosion inside the cargo hold;
- The explosion was the result of ignition of phosphine gas;
- It is highly probable that the fumigant tablets were not evenly distributed on the surface of the cargo;
- Uneven fumigant distribution caused an increase in the temperature in the headspace of the cargo hold, which may have exceeded the auto ignition of the phosphine gas;
- The ‘J-System’ on the vessel had no suction pipe fitted, compromising the efficiency of the system to draw the generated phosphine gas from the surface of the cargo.
Recommendations
- Bring document MSC.1/Circ.1264 on ‘Recommendations on the Safe Use of Pesticides in Ships Applicable to the Fumigation of Cargo Holds’ to the attention of serving crew members.
Disclaimer: The above image is for representation of the below incident and need not be considered as an actual case image.
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Source: Transport Malta
