Summary
During the 17 November 2015 night, the cruise ship was underway at 15 knots with a rough to very rough sea state in the vicinity of the Falkland Islands. 347 persons were on board. Soon after midnight, at the time of the engineers’ watchkeeping relief, a fire broke out in the diesel-generator compartment and spread quickly to the engine room upper decks. The vessel was then a dead ship without propulsion and only the equipment powered by the back-up group was working. The water-mist extinguishing system triggered automatically but was not efficient enough to prevent the fire to spread along bunched cables. The alarm was immediately raised.
Firefighting and protection teams managed to control the fire at 4.30 am but no plant could be restarted. As the vessel was drifting towards the coast, the master made the decision to drop anchor and to evacuate the passengers and almost all the crew members, with the support of the Royal Navy and her sister-ship owned by the same company. There were no injuries to the passengers or the crew.
Management of the investigation
When BEAmer arrived on board, the vessel had been towed and had just come alongside at Punta Arenas (Chile). No fuel circuit or diesel-generator element has been manoeuvred by the crew since the end of the firefighting.
The final version of the report includes the ship-owner’s comments and clarifications as well as suggestions for recommendations issued by the USCG and the NTSB (USA being a substantially interested state to be informed on the fitting-out of vessels built by Fincantieri shipyard).
Lessons Learnt
The 82nd session of MSC on November – December 2006 amended chapters II-1 and II-2 of the SOLAS convention, including criteria to improve the survivability of passenger ships after a major damage. The aim was to make it possible for crewmembers and passengers to stay safely on board, as the ship proceeds to port. The vessel has to be designed with redundant propulsion plant and vital systems.
On board the cruise ship, the redundancy (two electrical propulsion engines and four diesel-generators) is numerically assured. But the division between the DG room and the propulsion room is not a two totally separate and autonomous « engine compartment » architecture in case of fire or flooding of one of these compartments. Given the date of construction of the vessel, this provision did not apply.
The newbuilding service has integrated this new requirement for the next series of vessels. It appears in the tender specifications for the European shipyards.
Bunched cables
The conductivity of copper eased the spreading of fire to the upper decks, without HIFOG having an effective contribution to extinction. While many equipment were undamaged, electric feeder cabinets and bunched cables, located in the vicinity, were destroyed. Note however that the cabling was certified and complied with the standards required by the regulations.
Manual valve manifold control of the HI-FOG system
Given its location on board (on the bulkhead of the fuel treatment room), the valve manifold should have been manoeuvred by a firefighting team: the system should be safeguarded from high risk areas and a remote control should be possible (from the bridge).
Conclusions
The vessel was operating in an area where the Diesel-generators were fed with HFO;
The engineer officer who carried out the replacement of a clogged fuel filter element had been presumably misled by a faulty visual memory and undertook the disassembly of an element under pressure;
A fire broke out immediately at the DG3 turboblower and rapidly spread, via the bunched cables, to the upper decks of the engine compartment.
Measures Taken by the Shipowner
Night work:
A technical memorandum has been issued forbidding a person alone to undertake night work on the fuel feeding line.
Fire drills:
A technical memorandum has been distributed to masters making clear which specific issues have to be controlled by engineer and deck officers (cf. DPA letter, appendix C.10).
Fuel Duplex filters:
During the restoration of the vessel the fuel duplex filters will be replaced by new generation filters, fitted with a fuel pressure warning device and a purge valve.
Protection of the DG:
Under study by the technical service: – Installation of a protection screen placed forward the DG, – Possibility to fit monobloc lagging – covers identical to those used by new generation Wärtsilä DG.
Bunched cables:
The newbuilding service has initiated a study and considerations concerning the fire propagation mechanisms via bunched cables. Management of the evacuation: The management of the evacuation of the vessel, has it was perceived by certain passengers, has been incorporated in the feedback of this event.
Recommendations
BEAmer recommends:
To Ponant:
- to reflect on the opportunity of the presence of a mechanic rating during the night watches, particularly for work on fuel circuits and/or putting the crew or the vessel at risk.
- to explore the value of segregating MDO and HFO circuits feeding the DG.
- conduct a study on the most effective means of radio communication for fire-fighting teams.
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Source: BEAmer
