- Distraction and lack of focus lead to vessels striking installations.
- Officers engaged in non-navigational tasks were missing environmental changes.
- Bridge personnel are occupied with paperwork, causing unnoticed drift.
The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) has noted increased attendant ship collisions with offshore oil, gas, and renewable energy installations. These accidents are a result of breakdowns in navigational watch processes and systems, where watchkeeping personnel are getting distracted with non-navigational duties, losing situational awareness, and suffering communication breakdowns within the bridge team. Vessel operators and duty holders must put in place effective processes and systems to provide for vessel safety, especially for connected activities, reports HSE.
Loss of Situational Awareness
In a case, a Platform Supply Vessel (PSV) was approaching the 500m safety zone of a fixed installation. The Chief Officer, with a watchkeeping officer, went through all the necessary pre-entry checklists before commencing the approach. Yet, as the ship proceeded, the Chief Officer permitted its speed to be more than the usual rate. In the meantime, the watchkeeping officer was occupied with other things and failed to be of assistance in keeping an eye on the ship’s position. When the Chief Officer tried to manoeuvre back, the ship ran into the leg of the installation.
Failure to Keep a Proper Lookout
The other incident concerned a multi-role Emergency Response and Rescue Vessel (ERRV) lying off outside the 500m exclusion zone of a jack-up drilling facility. The Officer of the Watch (OOW) had just relieved the Master. The weather was fair but the OOW got distracted by administrative work, such as writing up meeting minutes and checking bridge radios. The lookout, who happened to be on the bridge, was also authorized to use the bridge computer, further minimizing active tracking of the ship’s location. When there was a shift in environmental conditions, the ship started drifting towards the installation undetected. A local PSV alerted the jack-up control room, which tried to make contact with the ERRV, but by the time the instructions were given, the vessel had already struck the leg of the installation.
Distractions due to Administrative Tasks
The same scenario happened when a PSV was waiting near a jack-up drilling installation during the day in fair weather. The ship was in ‘green dynamic positioning’ mode, which regulated surge but not sway. The Officer of the Watch assumed that remaining given the installation by keeping it visible through the front bridge window would prevent drifting and commenced administrative work on the bridge computer. The OOW’s side view was blocked by the ship’s structural elements, making it impossible to notice a sideways drift towards an adjacent fixed installation. The ship moved into the 500m safety zone unobserved and struck the leg of the installation.
Failure to Monitor Environmental Conditions
A PSV was involved in cargo operations on a mobile drilling installation during the night under marginal weather. The ship was in bow into the wind, drift-on configuration. When the crane operator on the installation asked for a heading change to reach cargo out of the crane’s range, the Master steered the vessel slightly off course before changing course. This alteration impacted the dynamic positioning system’s ability to hold position, creating an uncontrolled drift that resulted in a collision with the drilling installation.
Lack of Communication Between the Bridge Team
A situation involving a wind farm service operation vessel (SOV) occurred while passing through a wind farm during daylight and favourable weather. The vessel was in dynamic positioning (DP) mode, being controlled by a Dynamic Positioning Officer (DPO), with the Officer of the Watch doing a non-navigational activity. The DPO, unaware of the risk of collision, changed the vessel’s course to pass alongside a wind turbine. The Master, having entered the bridge with a different intention, realized the unfolding situation and took charge, but could not avoid the ship hitting the wind turbine.
Giving Clear Watchkeeping Instructions
Ship operators need to ensure they comply with International Maritime Organisation (IMO) rules for navigational watchkeeping. A good lookout must be maintained at all times, whether when a ship is on standby outside the 500m safety area or passing through a wind farm. There should be no other responsibilities that compromise lookout duties. Watchkeeping practices need to be properly established and unmistakable, setting forth particular expectations at all stages of a connected activity.
Revisiting Bridge Resource Management (BRM)
Effective bridge teamwork and communication must be reinforced to ensure navigational safety. The culture within the bridge team should support open communication and allow any member to challenge actions or omissions that may compromise safety. Operators should assess the design, arrangement, and use of bridge equipment, including electronic aids and automated functions. Comprehensive Bridge Resource Management (BRM) training should be integrated into competency assurance programs to enhance teamwork and situational awareness.
Enhanced Utilization of Bridge Alarms
All 150 or larger cargo ships must have a Bridge Navigational Watch Alarm System (BNWAS) that detects bridge activity and informs the Master if the OOW is incapacitated. The IMO requires BNWAS to be in use whenever a ship is underway. Duty holders and operators must keep BNWAS on during all activities connected to it. The alarm range must be based on the nearness of the vessel to installations, considering drift distances. The adoption of other protective measures, for example, proximity warning systems, must also be considered.
Observing Attendant Vessel Movement
Operators have to develop standard procedures for tracking attendant vessel movements. Detection of unauthorized methods to an installation should be given top priority through techniques like AIS monitoring, guard zones, automatic notification, or direct observation by an Emergency Response and Rescue Vessel (ERRV). If an ERRV is tasked with monitoring, its crew should be well-trained and well-equipped for the purpose. Automatic tracking and notification systems should be tested regularly to ensure their effectiveness. During prolonged standby periods, vessels should be positioned at a safe distance from installations, ensuring that any drift is noticeable and allows time for corrective action.
Conducting Sailing Audits for Marine Assurance
Current marine assurance procedures tend to depend on shore-based verification, which might fail to pick up on inadequate watchkeeping and bridge resource management practices. Sailing audits, in which an experienced assessor observes operations onboard a vessel in real-time, can assist in spotting unsafe practices and delivering on-the-spot mentoring to enhance standards of safety.
Health and Safety at Work Act (HSWA)
The Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 (Application Outside Great Britain) Order 2013 (AOGBO) applies safety rules outside the mainland to prescribed offshore activities. Section 3 of HSWA provides that employers should ensure that their operations do not place others at risk of health and safety. This necessitates that vessels be operated in a way that reduces collision hazards with offshore installations. The HSE expects risk management systems to address potential human failures by identifying and mitigating performance-influencing factors.
Offshore Installation and Pipeline Works Regulations 1995
Regulation 8 of these regulations places an obligation on the masters of ships and all personnel engaged in a related activity to assist the Offshore Installation Manager (OIM) in maintaining compliance with safety provisions. This obligation is placed on all persons who are in charge of offshore operations, such as vessel operators, owners, managers, and crew.
International Maritime Regulations
Adherence to international maritime conventions, specifically the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention, Chapter V, Regulation 15, is critical in the reduction of the risk of collisions. The regulations require the application of effective measures in managing risk to ensure vessel navigation is devoid of human error.
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Source: HSE
