Transport Malta summarizes the safety investigation into the fire, which led to a fatality and a serious injury, on board an oil/chemical tanker.
The Incident
The tanker departed from the port of Livorno, Italy, bound for Gabes, Tunisia, on 09 September 2021. The engineers planned two maintenance tasks for 11 September, one of which was to be executed by the chief engineer, the motorman and the fitter on the vessel’s main deck, while the other was assigned to the second and the third engineers in the fuel oil separators’ room.
During the work in the separators’ room, a fire broke out and rapidly spread through various parts of the engine-room. Only the third engineer managed to escape out of the space with serious injuries. The second engineer succumbed to his injuries, resulting from the fire.
The safety investigation concluded that the fire was caused either by thermal oil, or an oil mist generated after the thermal oil gushing from an open-ended thermal oil branch line, which was being unclogged by the second and third engineers. The exact ignition source could not be confirmed; however, the safety investigation believes that the fire was ignited when the hot thermal oil / oil mist came into contact with heat sources inside the separators’ room.
Taking into consideration the actions by the Company, the Marine Safety Investigation Unit (MSIU) issued no recommendations.
Cause
Three crew members suffered burn injuries, which were fatal for one of them, after a fire broke out in the separators’ room and spread through the engine room.
Actions taken
- The fire expert appointed by the Company provided a detailed de-briefing of his findings, during crew conferences held by the Company in November 2021 and May 2022. During the second conference, the Company’s CEO stressed the need for understanding and implementing the Company’s ‘stop-work’ policy.
- The Company’s investigation report was circulated among its fleet of vessels, and all vessels were requested to conduct an extraordinary safety meeting to discuss the findings of the report and the ‘stop-work’ policy.
- The Company instructed all master and chief engineers serving with its fleet, not to carry out any work on thermal oil systems in use for heating bunker oils, without acquiring specific and detailed permission from the Company.
- The Company implemented a two-step approval process, whereby a vessel now has to obtain permission from the Technical Department and the Marine Department prior to conducting maintenance work on any pressurized system.
- The Company approached all its vessels to ensure that maintenance on the free-flow capability of thermal oil pipes (for heating bunker oils) has been ensured prior to the change-over to VLSFO.
- The Company simplified its safety management system (SMS), by following the Lovoy Method, to make the understanding of the Company’s policies and procedures more simple than they were at the time of this accident.
Recommendations
In view of the conclusions reached and taking into consideration the safety actions taken during the course of the safety investigation no recommendations have been issued.
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Source: Transport Malta
