Lessons Learned: Serious Burn Injuries to a Crew Member

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Transport Malta has published an investigation report regarding an incident that took place in the morning of 26 September 2022, whilst a bulk carrier was drifting outside the Republic of Korea’s territorial waters, the fitter was assigned to replace a leaking hydraulic pipe on the main deck.

The incident

An oxy-acetylene torch cut the Ubolts, which secured the pipe to the pipe supports on the deck.

Whilst cutting the last U-bolt, which was close to the forward flange, the pipe slipped off its supports. Oil from the pipe splashed onto the fitter and immediately ignited. The crew members assisted the fitter in extinguishing the flames on his coveralls, following which he was administered first-aid. The injured fitter was eventually evacuated to a shore hospital for further medical treatment.

The safety investigation concluded that prior to the commencement of the task, the hydraulic oil pipe had not been completely drained. Two recommendations have been made to the Company to enhance onboard assessment of risks.

Analysis

Aim

The purpose of a marine safety investigation is to determine the circumstances and safety factors of the accident as a basis for making recommendations, and to prevent further marine casualties or incidents from occurring in the future.

Safety investigation actions

The MSIU was notified of this occurrence on 03 October 2022 i.e., one week later. By then, the vessel had received its voyage orders and was already en route to its destination port of Vancouver, USA.

A representative of the MSIU boarded the vessel at Vancouver to interview the crew members and collect relevant accident data for the safety investigation.
The Company advised the safety investigation that the injured fitter had communicated his unwillingness to participate in an interview until he recovered
completely. To this extent, the safety investigation was unable to interview him.

Cause of injuries

Hydraulic oil splashed onto the fitter from the hydraulic oil pipe and ignited when it came into contact with the flame of the oxyacetylene torch being used. As a result, the fitter’s coveralls caught fire, causing deep, second and third degree burns over 70% of his body.

Conclusions

  • The fitter’s coveralls caught fire, caused by the ignition of a spray of hydraulic oil from the pipe that the fitter was working on.
  • The fitter was using an oxy-acetylene set to cut off the U-bolts on a leaking section of a hydraulic pipeline, which was part of the remote operating system for the water ballast tank valves.
  • After the occurrence, the crew members found that a valve between one of the accumulators and the return pipeline, was open, as a result of which, the return pipeline may have been under pressure.
  • An observed reduction in the oil leak may have misled the crew members to believe that the pipeline had been depressurized and drained.
  • Although a fire hose was connected to a hydrant and placed near the work site, the fire pump was not switched on.
  • The fitter’s unawareness of the hazard was a pivotal factor on how the accident dynamics had evolved.
  • It is highly likely that the fitter’s coveralls did not offer any fire protection.

Safety actions taken

During the safety investigation, the Company had carried out an internal investigation, in accordance with the requirements of the ISM Code. Following their investigation, the Company took the following actions:

  • the investigation report was discussed with all crew member on board Milagro;
  • the investigation report was circulated across the Company’s fleet;
  • the investigation report was used in its training centers as a case study for engineers at pre-embarkation training sessions;
  • instructions and precautions for the replacement of a unit, device or a pipe of the hydraulic oil system, were posted in the hydraulic power unit room on board Milagro; and
  • all crew members who were assigned to the task on board Milagro, were provided with additional training on the SMS procedures for hot work and work on pressurized systems.

Recommendations

Considering the safety actions already taken, TMS Dry Ltd. (Cardiff Marine), is recommended to:

  • 17/2023_R1 bring this safety investigation report to the attention of serving crew members, to raise awareness on the expected potential differences in the way seafarers may perceive (and hence) accept risk;
  • 17/2023_R2 promote a training regime, which encourages crew members to engage in accident simulations to enhance risk assessment measures as part of the implementation of the vessel’s safety management.

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Source: Transport Malta