The characteristics and behaviors used to identify the shadow fleet (vessels serving sanctioned nations like Russia, Iran, and Venezuela) have evolved significantly between 2023 and 2025 due to intensified sanctions and the resulting adaptive tactics. The changes in the shadow fleet’s operational and structural profile mean that compliance analysts must look beyond simple giveaways like frequent AIS blackouts and focus on more sophisticated indicators.
Shifting Telltale Giveaways: 2023 vs 2025
While the core concept of the shadow fleet remains the same—using older vessels, opaque ownership, and non-Western insurance—the methods used to obscure these facts have become more sophisticated.
Ownership and Registration (The ‘Gray’ Fleet)
- 2023: Focus was heavily on the “Dark Fleet”—vessels with intentionally obscure ownership and flags, often associated with Iran and Venezuela, and a rapidly expanding Russian fleet acquiring large numbers of aging tankers.
- 2025: The focus has shifted to the “Gray Fleet.” These vessels exhibit less overtly illegal behavior but employ practices that make sanctions compliance difficult, such as:
- Flag-Hopping at its Peak: Vessels frequently switch flags to evade scrutiny, exploiting permissive global flag registries with minimal due diligence.
- New Jurisdictions: New management and ownership companies are being established in less-scrutinized jurisdictions like the Seychelles, Mauritius, and the Marshall Islands to obscure Russian links and appear law-abiding.
- Ownership Obfuscation: The Gray Fleet is often characterized by very weak ownership structures and the use of shell companies, with many owners or operators having been set up after February 2022.
Deceptive Shipping Practices (DSPs)
- 2023: AIS (Automatic Identification System) manipulation—specifically “going dark” (switching off the transponder)—was a primary indicator.
- 2025: While AIS manipulation remains a tactic, sanctioned actors are using more nuanced DSPs to avoid detection by increasingly sophisticated AI and satellite monitoring:
- Falsified Positions/Spoofing: Deliberately manipulating a ship’s location or identification data to mask illegal activity.
- Regulated Ship-to-Ship (STS) Transfers: Using intermediary vessels for STS transfers on the high seas, which is legal but often prohibited for sanctioned entities, to obscure the cargo’s origin. This is now a more critical indicator as the vessels are more aware of the tracking of simple AIS gaps.
- Port Diversion: Sanctions are now targeting specific infrastructure (like the Rizhao Shihua Terminal in a recent example), forcing sanctioned vessels and mainstream shipping alike to constantly adjust routing and port calls, making “unusual” port behavior a less reliable standalone indicator.
Did you subscribe to our daily Newsletter?
It’s Free Click here to Subscribe!
Source: Lloyd’s List
