On the basis of the analysed incidents, it can be stated that the special teams participating in MIRG operations were very well trained and carried out their tasks to a high standard. For this reason, most of the observations on MIRG operations are positive.
RCCs prepare for ship fires and their threats before they happen and draw up separate operating plans for such eventualities. For this reason, their responses to ship fires were efficient and appropriate. The actual firefighting mission did not fail in any of these cases due to inadequacies in planning or capabilities. External on-scene help led to a good outcome in all the analysed cases, without exception. The greatest challenge is the response time of MIRG teams in their deployment to the scene of the incident, which is heavily linked not only to the location of the incident but also to where the MIRG teams and SAR helicopters are stationed, and the co-operation between them and the RCCs.
The level of skills and operational capabilities of the crews of commercial vessels varied greatly in the incidents, even though in all cases the crews and their training were in line with STCW requirements. On smaller cargo ships, in particular, there were clear shortcomings in operations, whereas the crews of larger passenger vessels were more efficient. This is largely due to the fact that passenger vessel crews are generally better trained, their turnover is lower and they hold more fire drills.
On the basis of the analysis, the working group recommends that the following issues be taken into consideration in developing co-operation between MIRG operations and the vessel:
1) Each coastal nation should have the ability and readiness to dispatch a specially trained team to provide external help to support vessel crews in firefighting operations
It should be possible to use MIRG teams, or parts thereof, flexibly in responding to incidents.
In the case of ship fires, the rapid arrival of external help to support crew in limiting damage is particularly important. It should be possible to rapidly deploy a special group (MIRG team) and it should have the ability to initiate firefighting and damage control measures as soon as possible after its arrival on scene. This requires a team with light equipment that can be mobilised rapidly, and whose primary task is to take initial steps to bring the situation under control or slow down the spread of damage to the extent that the ship can be brought to a port of refuge to save the people on board or evacuated in a controlled manner.
If the situation is prolonged, this team can serve as the backbone for a longer operation focusing on not only damage limitation but also national interests, which are often related to preventing or limiting environmental damage. The place of refuge process for the vessel is an integral part of these operations.
There is no doubt that the use of professionally skilled and properly equipped external help in dealing with ship fires is advantageous if they can be transported to the scene fast enough. However, it should also be noted that even merely sending a MIRG Fire Liaison Officer on Board to the distress vessel facilitates both assessing the safety of the distress vessel and communications between the distress vessel and the RCC. Thanks to more effective communications, SAR and other 36 (40) Baltic Sea Maritime Incident Response Group Project participating authorities share the same situational awareness as the distress vessel. A consistent and accurate picture of the situation significantly facilitates making the right decisions and viable operating plans at the RCC. At the same time, the MIRG Fire Liaison Officer on Board can support the master of the vessel with decision-making concerning rescue operations on board the vessel.
The threshold for using the MIRG teams of neighbouring countries in assisting with ship fires should be lowered. Joint co-ordination models and standard operating procedures should be created to ensure safety and efficiency in joint operations, as has been noted in numerous projects (Baltic Sea MIRG, MIRG EU).
2) The RCC and emergency services should have a joint operating model and co-operation agreement (or equivalent) for how to quickly deploy a MIRG expert/MIRG Liaison Officer specialised in ship fires to the RCC
All of the analysed incidents used an (emergency services) MIRG Liaison Officer (expert) at the RCC.
The MIRG Liaison Officer serves as an emergency services expert at the RCC, supporting and under the command of the Search and Rescue Mission Coordinator. He or she is in contact with the MIRG teams involved in the mission and other participating emergency services, plans the continuity of MIRG operations, and keeps the emergency services that dispatched MIRG units up to date on the development of the situation.
3) The co-ordination and command structure of external help used in ship fires should be clarified
The greatest challenges in the management and control of MIRG teams concern situations in which the responsibility for co-ordinating and commanding firefighting operations is transferred to an on-shore organisation, for instance after people have been rescued or the distress vessel has been towed/brought to shore. In this, the importance of co-ordinated, controlled and situationally appropriate handover of responsibilities is emphasised.
When a decision is made to tow/bring a vessel to port, co-ordination and command is transferred and divided among different parties, depending on the country in question (note, for instance, the role of the port in different countries). As firefighting efforts continue at port, general command over the situation is as a rule transferred from SAR to emergency services. The situation is then most commonly co-ordinated by the firemaster of the local emergency services together with the master of the vessel and any other authorities at the port.
In the analysed cases, there was no ambiguity among the leadership regarding command roles, but there was occasional uncertainty at the rescue unit level. In cases where firefighting at sea using MIRG teams is unsuccessful and a decision is made to move the vessel to port to extinguish the fire, the position of the onboard MIRG team with respect to the emergency services leading the firefighting efforts at port may cause uncertainty. This is particularly the case in situations where the MIRG team is from the area of operations of other emergency services or even from abroad. Baltic Sea Maritime Incident Response Group Project (40) 37.
4) Base locations, transport logistics and on-call arrangements of MIRG units and SAR helicopters should be developed as a whole
In order to ensure appropriate and rapid response to distress vessels in ship fire situations, the on-call arrangements and logistics chain of MIRG bases and units transporting MIRG teams (helicopters, boats) should be examined as a single whole, so that both the MIRG team and helicopter used to transport it do not have to wait unnecessarily in alert situations.
This is particularly important when very few helicopters are available and the Search and Rescue Mission Co-ordinator must prioritise the tasks of units. If a SAR helicopter must wait for a MIRG team, the SMC may order the helicopter to proceed directly to the scene of the incident to safeguard the evacuation of those on board the vessel; this will complicate and in some cases even completely prevent the transportation of the MIRG team to the vessel.
An efficiently integrated logistics chain enables transporting external help faster to the distress vessel and the more efficient use of SAR helicopters.
5) Joint ship fire drills between vessels and MIRG teams should be developed in co-operation with the responsible SAR authority
Chapter V(7.3) of the SOLAS Convention requires that passenger ships to which Chapter I of the Convention applies must have on board a plan for co-operation with appropriate SAR services in the event of an emergency. The plan must be developed in co-operation between the vessel, the company, as defined in Regulation IX/1 (owner of the ship), and the SAR services. The plan must include provisions for periodic exercises to be undertaken to test its effectiveness. The plan must be developed based on the guidelines developed by the Organisation (IMO). The contents of said plan have been further specified in IMO circular MSC / Circ. 1079.
Although this obligation only concerns passenger vessels in international traffic, it is recommended that other vessels would draft similar plans for use in accident situations. Cargo ships should also carry out drills of joint operations with SAR authorities covering different kinds of incidents.
Drills can serve to lower the vessel’s threshold for requesting external help to deal with incidents. Communications between the vessel, SAR authorities and MIRG teams to maintain situational awareness would also be facilitated by using a shared method to assess the safety risks of the vessel. This method would be incorporated into joint drills. One suitable method is “Vessel Triage,” in which the vessel status is assessed using a four-step scale on the basis of threat factors (for additional information on Vessel Triage, see: www.raja.fi/vesseltriage).
6) Redundancy in division of work related to emergencies on ships should be developed to withstand the absence of individual key persons
On the basis of the analysed ship fires, it can be stated that the operating models of the vessels had not sufficiently prepared for eventualities in which individual key persons (for instance, the firemaster of the ship) became suddenly unable to perform their duties (such as due to an accident or illness). The unexpected 38 (40) Baltic Sea Maritime Incident Response Group Project absence of a key person leads to the greatest shortcomings particularly in terms of co-ordinating operations and achieving situational awareness.
For this reason, the emergency operating models and division of work on ships should be developed to ensure that the unexpected absence of any individual will not paralyse operations in the event of a fire or other such incident. Problems caused by the absence of key people can also be easily reflected in the use of external help, as very few senior officers on vessels know how to use external help efficiently.
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Source: MIRG Baltic Sea
